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CHAPTER 8 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE COURTS 
 
Elizabeth Gross and Paul Stretesky 
 
The environmental justice movement recognizes the importance of social equity when 
assessing environmental burdens and benefits (Bullard 1990; Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 
2008). As a result, environmental justice concerns are diverse and focus on a variety of issues. 
As Bunyan Bryant (1995, 6) makes clear, environmental justice “refers to those cultural norms 
and values, rules, regulations, behaviors, policies, and decisions to support sustainable 
communities where people can interact with confidence that the environment is safe, nurturing, 
and productive [and is] is supported by decent paying safe jobs, quality school and recreation; 
decent housing and adequate health care; democratic decision-making and personal 
empowerment.”  
The focus of this chapter is on environmental justice in the courts, which makes up only 
one small portion of the movement’s overall concerns and activities. More specifically, this 
chapter emphasizes corrective justice, or the role of contemporary U.S. courts in punishing 
environmental offenders and/or reversing environmental injustices (Weinrib 2012). Prior to 
examining the way courts function with respect to environmental justice we briefly examine 
major federal environmental justice policies that attempt to direct environmental enforcement. 
We focus on federal environmental justice policy because this is the level of governance at 
which a significant amount of court activity has occurred. We draw upon that policy to examine 
whether federal agencies have pursued environmental justice goals set out in those policies in the 
courts. 
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President Clinton’s executive order on environmental justice did not stress the role of the 
courts as a way to address environmental equity. In fact, the only mention of judicial review in 
Executive Order 12898 (EO 12898) highlighted its limits.  Nevertheless, evaluating 
environmental justice in the courts is important to consider for a couple of reasons. First, the 
courts are often the end point of enforcement cases brought by the EPA and other agencies 
against regulated entities for violating environmental laws. Their decisions, therefore, are a 
critical component of enforcement. Second, many in the environmental justice scholarly and 
advocacy community have argued that the courts provide an important venue for holding 
government accountable under existing statutes.  This was reflected in President Clinton’s 
memorandum that accompanied Executive Order 12898 (EO 12898), which emphasized that 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the National Environmental Policy Act were 
important vehicles through which environmental justice claims might be addressed.  
For these reasons, consideration of environmental justice in the courts is an important 
component in any evaluation of federal environmental justice policy. With this in mind, the first 
part of the chapter, examine if the courts encourage environmental injustice by providing lenient 
sentences to some environmental offenders. Overall, the research on this issue suggests that the 
monetary fines and penalties that are handed down from the courts are not directly 
discriminatory – that is they don’t appear to disproportionately penalize industries in white and 
affluent communities and ignore violations in poor and minority communities. Instead, it appears 
that if discrimination in sentencing exists it is likely to be indirect. 
In the next section  we question whether the courts are correcting environmental injustice 
by ruling that the unequal siting of facilities violates civil rights law. We look to see if courts, as 
potential agents of positive change, diminish environmental injustice by opening up 
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opportunities for communities to challenge discriminatory siting. We carry out this investigation 
in the case of Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), and litigation of state environmental justice claims. Unfortunately, we discover that 
although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) continually emphasizes the need for 
effective implementation of Title VI, the courts appear hesitant to use the Civil Rights Act to 
achieve environmental justice. This is most apparent in the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
Alexander v. Sandoval (2001), which, while not an environmental justice case itself, does operate 
to significantly limit the effectiveness of the Civil Rights Act for environmental justice plaintiffs. 
We suggest that the cases coming out of Alexander v. Sandoval demonstrate the lack of 
commitment within courts to support environmental justice efforts. We, unfortunately, discover a 
similar lack of commitment with regard to the Equal Protection Clause and NEPA in 
environmental justice cases. 
Finally, we conclude this chapter by proposing potential studies and strategies for 
addressing environmental injustice and achieving favorable environmental justice outcomes. 
 
Federal Environmental Justice Policy and the Role of the Courts 
The role of courts in environmental policy has a long history in the United States 
(McSpadden 1995; Melnick 1983; O’Leary 1993). Courts may adjudicate environmental 
violations, shape the definition of environmental problems through their interpretations of 
environmental law, decide whether environmental laws are constitutional, determine which 
agencies have authority over environmental management issues, and engage in judicial review of 
agency decisions (Burns, Lynch, and Stretesky 2009). As a result, courts influence 
4"
"
environmental justice outcomes through cases brought before them for adjudication, appeal, 
and/or review. Because agency priorities may influence the types of cases that are brought before 
the courts we highlight the priorities identified in EO 12898, the EPA’s recently developed 
environmental justice strategy, Plan EJ 2014, as well as the role of Title VI. 
Among the most important environmental justice policy developments in the U.S. was 
the issuance of EO 12898 on February 11, 1994, by President Bill Clinton (Bowers 1995; 
Bullard and Johnson 2000; O’Neil 2007). Section 1-1 of EO 12898 states, “Each Federal agency 
shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as 
appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its 
programs, policies, and activities.” Importantly, EO 12898 applies to all federal agencies, two of 
which are especially important to the order’s ideals: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The EPA issues pollution permits, may bring 
administrative and civil actions against offenders that violate environmental regulations, and 
participates in the mitigation of uncontrolled and abandoned waste sites throughout the country, 
a practice that often involves courts. The DOJ may initiate criminal cases against offenders who 
violate environmental laws (Burns, Lynch, and Stretesky 2009). Unfortunately, research on the 
effectiveness of EO 12898 appears to suggest that the policy has had little impact on 
environmental justice outcomes in either agency (Konisky, 2009a; Murphy-Green and Leip 
2002; O’Neil 2007; Sims 2013). Bonner (2012, 100) perceives, “while the objectives of EO 
12898 aim to mitigate the adverse impact of environmental policies on minorities, it is unclear 
whether it has been successful.” It is also important to point out that EO 12898 is not directly 
enforceable in the courts. 
As discussed below, EO 12898 can potentially influence the EPA and DOJ through its 
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implementation and use of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This point was emphasized 
in President Clinton’s memo that accompanied the order (Clinton, 1994). Specifically, the 
president states,  
In accordance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, each Federal agency 
shall ensure that all programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance 
that affect human health or the environment do not directly, or through 
contractual or other arrangements, use criteria, methods, or practices that 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 
 
Title VI stops discrimination by entities that receive federal funds. In theory the EPA can use 
Title VI to prevent the federal funding of state and local governments that issue pollution permits 
that create a disparate impact. Thus, Title VI has been viewed as a powerful weapon in fighting 
environmental injustice, especially given the priorities in EO 12898. According to the EPA there 
are, however, relatively few Title IV investigations and even fewer Title VI settlements 
(http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/TitleVIcases/index.html). The DOJ has not, as of yet, brought 
any Title VI cases forward. The lack of Title VI cases suggests that the courts have played a very 
limited role in achieving environmental justice though Title VI. As discussed later in this 
chapter, the court has also interpreted Title VI narrowly, especially in relation to private actions, 
and this interpretation has limited its effectiveness and therefore conflicts with the spirit of EO 
12898 as Clinton (1994) first envisioned it. 
When EO 12898 was established, EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner (1994, 13) 
reported in the agency’s Environmental Justice Strategy  that “strong and effective enforcement 
of environmental and civil rights laws is fundamental to virtually every mission of EPA”. 
Recently environmental justice organizations have renewed their attempts to advocate for civil 
rights through Title VI. As a result, federal agencies appear to have a renewed interest in 
achieving environmental justice outcomes. For example, the EPA recently reconvened the 
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Federal Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice in 2010 for the first time in over a 
decade.. Currently, the EPA (2013, 1) states in the Plan EJ 2014 Progress Report that “for the 
first time in its 42 year history, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has laid the 
cornerstones for fully implementing its environmental justice (EJ) mission of ensuring 
environmental protection for all Americans, regardless of race, color, national origin, income or 
education.” Plan EJ 2014 includes a new emphasis on Title VI, and the EPA (2011a, 31) 
highlights that “administrator Lisa Jackson has made a commitment to reform and revitalize the 
Agency’s Title VI program, which includes ensuring that recipients of EPA Federal Assistance 
comply with their Civil Rights requirements.” 
In addition to the focus on using Title VI, the Council on Environmental Quality has used 
EO 12898 to guide National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) assessments and environmental 
impact statements that describe the effects of federal agency actions. The idea is that NEPA must 
take environmental justice issues into consideration when preparing impact statements. When 
potential environmental injustice is identified, proposed mitigating efforts should be considered. 
Unfortunately, the federal government is not required to adopt environmental justice 
recommendations within NEPA. Because agencies need only consider environmental impacts, 
EO 12898 may be prevented from being a more effective policy tool for achieving environmental 
justice (Bratspies et al. 2008). As we suggest below, NEPA is still not used to achieve 
environmental justice. Nevertheless, the EPA (2011a, 32) has recently suggested that NEPA will 
be used much more aggressively in the future. 
 
The Distribution of Court Penalties 
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The environmental justice movement has a long history in the U.S. and can be 
interpreted as emerging from a series of complex historical events that have brought 
together civil rights activists, traditional environmentalists, anti-toxic activists, workers, 
and academics (Taylor 2000; Cole and Foster 2001). Within the movement these groups 
of actors share common “motives, background, and perspectives” (Cole and Foster 2001, 
32). In particular, academics are one set of actors that have produced studies that are used 
in the courts to demonstrate how environmental hazards are distributed by race and class 
(e.g., Bullard, 1983; Mennis, 2005). For example, Robert Bullard’s work on waste 
incinerators in Houston, Texas, is seen as critically important to the movement’s 
academic roots. (Bullard 1990; Cole and Foster 2001). Bullard’s early efforts at bringing 
empirical evidence of environmental inequity directly to the courts has generated 
considerable attention from the movement, as these studies provide an opportunity to 
help frame grievances (see Cole and Foster 2001, 25). 
The first academic study to examine whether courts are biased in their application of 
penalties did not occur until 1992, when Lavelle and Coyle published an article that examined 
whether race and class inequalities exist in the distribution of monetary penalties imposed by the 
courts for violations of the Clean Air Act (CAA); the Clean Water Act (CWA); the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA); and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 
Importantly, their study examined only the distribution of penalties among all federal violations 
contained in the EPA DOCKET database, looking at administrative and civil violations between 
the years of 1985 and 1991. While their results are limited to noncriminal actions in federal 
courts, the implications for environmental justice are significant. As Ringquist (1998, 1151) 
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notes, “The study received a good deal of press coverage [and] is often cited by environmental 
justice advocates as an example of how government actions discriminate against minorities and 
the poor to perpetuate inequalities in exposure to pollution.”   
Lavelle and Coyle (1992) studied injustice in the courts by obtaining the racial and 
economic demographics of each zip code where environmental violation(s) occurred. Zip codes 
were ranked by race and income and then compared according to the mean monetary penalties 
reported in DOCKET. The researchers found that violations in white zip codes received penalties 
that averaged $153,607 while violations that occurred in minority zip codes received penalties 
that averaged $105,028. They also discovered that the mean penalty in high-income zip codes 
was higher ($146,993) than the mean penalty in low-income zip codes ($95,564). But these 
results did not hold up when the authors examined the type of violation. For example, CERCLA 
violations received higher fines in minority zip codes than in white zip codes. In addition, higher 
penalties were found in low-income zip codes than in high-income zip codes except in the case 
of CWA violations. Lavelle and Coyle’s results are suggestive of environmental injustice in the 
courts in the case of race, but their findings are far from definitive, especially in the case of 
income. Importantly, the researchers did not control for competing variables that may have 
produced the differences they observed. 
Ringquist (1998) also examined penalties between the years 1974 and 1991 and found 
little evidence of environmental injustice in sentencing disparity after adjusting for case 
characteristics, judge attributes, and the political environment. Moreover, his analysis suggested 
that a 1 percent increase in the percentage of minorities living in a given zip code was associated 
with a 1 percent increase in an environmental fine. This relationship is the opposite of what the 
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environmental injustice hypothesis would predict, since penalties in zip codes that are 
predominately African American are larger than penalties in zip codes that are largely white. 
One additional study by Atlas (2001) also examined the DOCKET database to see if there 
is significant discrimination against minorities and the poor in the case of civil penalties for 
environmental violations. Atlas (2001) examined DOCKET violations by census tracts rather 
than zip codes and controlled for many of the same variables as Ringquist. Atlas (2001) 
discovered that minority neighborhoods were fined an average of $133,808 while white areas 
were fined an average of $113,791, leading him to conclude that there is little “basis for 
concluding that penalties are lower in disproportionately minority or low-income areas.” Taken 
together, research on civil penalties suggests that courts do not discriminate by race or income 
when penalizing environmental violators. 
These findings of no relationship between court decisions and punishment can be 
generalized to other types of court penalty studies as well. For example, Lynch, Stretesky, and 
Burns (2004) examined environmental fines leveled against 153 petroleum refineries for 
administrative, civil, and criminal violations of environmental laws. These environmental 
violations were primarily adjudicated in federal courts. The authors used race and economic 
demographics at both the census tract and zip code levels to study the community characteristics 
around refineries that violate the law. When studying census tracts they discovered that, after 
controlling for the type of crime and company characteristics, court-ordered fines were 
approximately equal for refineries operating in white and minority areas. This was not the case 
for zip codes. Cross-sectional results suggest that a 1 standard deviation increase in the 
percentage of Hispanic residents was associated with a 95% decrease in the penalty amount. The 
researchers could not rule out the possibility of aggregation effects but noted that this result 
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suggests that refineries situated in Hispanic zip codes are much less likely to be punished by the 
courts than refineries located in white zip codes.  
Research has also been conducted on criminal violations. Greife (2012), for example, 
examined environmental justice issues in the case of penalties against companies found guilty for 
criminal violations of environmental law. Greife focused only on violations adjudicated by the 
DOJ, and found that while crime seriousness and company characteristics were good predictors 
of monetary penalties, the average income of residents living within three miles of the violation 
location was also an important predictor. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in residents earning 
more than $75,000 in annual income was associated with an increase in criminal penalties on the 
order of $236,297. He did not find evidence of environmental injustice with respect to race. 
Greife also conducted a post hoc analysis, and argues that prosecutors “overcharge” those 
environmental offenders who commit their crimes near wealthy residents. He demonstrates this 
argument empirically by showing that maximum allowable fines are elevated in high-income 
neighborhoods and that this elevated potential is what leads the court to give higher-than-average 
penalties to offenders. Greife’s results are interesting in that they are similar to those of 
Ringquist and Atlas. However, with respect to criminal violations, the economic injustice that 
may be occurring when punishing environmental offenders may be a function of prosecutors and 
not the court.  
More research is needed to examine the behavior of investigative agencies and 
prosecuting attorneys when examining environmental penalties. As Sims (2013, 16) notes, 
“Environmental justice advocates have long protested . . . relative inattention of environmental 
enforcement officials to violations that primarily affect these communities.” Specifically, 
researchers should examine where and how investigations are carried out and the willingness of 
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prosecutors and regulatory attorneys to enforce environmental violations by filing those 
violations in the courts. Our review suggests that there is little discrimination in courts 
sentencing environmental offenders. This is not surprising given that prosecutors and regulatory 
attorneys have considerably more discretion than judges, because prosecutors and regulatory 
attorneys have the discretion to move a case forward. As a result, biases in sentences may not 
appear because prosecutors have brought forth only cases that are “worthy” of enforcement 
(Davis 1998). Missing from statistical analysis of sentencing disparity are cases that may not 
receive attention because of community characteristics. We therefore encourage future 
researchers to examine the potential role of investigators and prosecutors in detecting 
environmental violations and bringing them forward to the courts. Specifically, do extra legal 
case characteristics determine if cases are brought forward to prosecutors and/or the courts? Do 
community characteristics influence inspection levels or the severity of charges filed in court? 
Answering these questions is critical to understanding how environmental injustice develops and 
if courts can play a role in mitigating that injustice. 
 
The Role of Courts in Achieving Environmental Justice 
The general role of the courts in environmental justice–related claims is to consider the 
plaintiff’s claim and determine whether a violation of law has been proven and, if so, what action 
will be taken to address the proven violation. Often, environmental justice claims are brought by 
citizens who sue the government on the grounds that it made a siting or permitting decision that 
adversely affects or will affect their community (Cole, 1993). The courts consider evidence and 
argument and, if a violation is established, could issue an injunction to prohibit the government’s 
action from taking effect. Depending on the kind of case and claims proven, the court could, 
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theoretically, order damages. In practice, it is difficult to prove a violation of law on 
environmental justice grounds, and, as a result, the courts have generally not issued orders 
against alleged environmental justice offenders. 
In this section we examine common legal claims asserted by plaintiffs in the courts. We 
examine the extent to which these lawsuits result in outcomes that may reduce environmental 
injustice in the case of Title VI, the Equal Protection Clause, the National Environmental Policy 
Act, and litigation of state environmental justice claims.  
 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
Environmental justice plaintiffs often utilize Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in 
their efforts to establish that they have been illegally subjected to disproportionate environmental 
consequences.  A large body of legal scholarship has outlined various arguments for using Title 
VI to redress violations of environmental justice (e.g., Cole 1991; Godsil 1991; Hammer 1996; 
Mank 1999a 1999b, 2008). The EPA itself issued guidance over the years to clarify the agency’s 
interpretation and implementation of Title VI. In 1998, the EPA issued draft guidance 
establishing how the agency would investigate Title VI complaints and environmental justice 
challenges to permits (U.S. EPA 1998). This guidance, particularly the portion that outlined the 
disparate impact analysis that the Agency would use to evaluate state-issued permits, was met 
with stiff resistance. State and local governments, represented by groups such as the 
Environmental Council of the States, the National Governors Association, the National 
Association Counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors complained that the guidance was too 
vague and infringed on their local land use authority. Government officials, joined by members 
of the business community, also objected on the grounds that the guidance would interfere with 
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efforts to economically revitalize urban areas (Ringquist 2004; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
2003). Members of Congress complained that the guidance would stifle economic development, 
and from 1998-2001, it enacted appropriations bills that suspended EPA’s authority to accept 
new Title VI cases. The EPA issued revised guidance in 2000 to address some of the previously 
raised concerns, but they remain unsatisfactory to many environmental justice stakeholders.  
 
Important Case Law 
The extent to which environmental justice claims can be redressed through Title VI is 
also highly-dependent on case law. Two provisions of Title VI – Section 601 and Section 602 – 
are most relevant.  Section 601 of Title VI provides that no person shall, "on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" 
(Civil Rights Act, 1964). But in order to prevail on a Section 601 claim, plaintiffs must prove 
intentional discrimination. For example, in Alexander v. Sandoval (2001, 275, 280), the United 
States Supreme Court stated that “it is . . . beyond dispute . . . that § 601 prohibits only 
intentional discrimination.” However, it has been recognized that racial and ethnic discrimination 
is an “often-intractable problem” and that “it is often difficult to obtain direct evidence of [the] 
motivating animus” (306, 307n13 [dissent]). The observation that it is difficult to find direct 
evidence of discrimination is confirmed by scientific studies that find that racial and economic 
segregation around environmental hazards may intensify over time in what can only be described 
as indirect discrimination (Stretesky and Hogan 1998). As a result, the court’s focus on direct 
discrimination is unlikely to increase environmental equity. Specifically, it ignores larger social 
forces that may be discriminatory and therefore contribute to environmental injustice (Stretesky 
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and Hogan 1998). In addition, it is well-recognized that it is exceedingly hard to establish proof 
of direct discrimination (Davis 1998). 
One example of the way Section 601 of Title VI may play out in courts is through cases 
such as South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
(2006, hereafter South Camden), a case which was first heard in U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Jersey in 2001, was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and 
was then remanded back to the district court level for further proceedings. In that case the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection issued a permit for the construction and 
operation of a grinding facility in a neighborhood where 91 percent of the residents were 
minority. South Camden Citizens argued intentional discrimination in the siting of the facility 
and introduced statistical evidence by Mennis (2005) to show a pattern of environmental 
injustice in New Jersey (South Camden 2006). While the court recognized that the environmental 
effects of the facility siting could bear more heavily on minorities than non-minorities, it cited 
Mennis’s own testimony that “any disparate impact that exists does not, by itself, support a 
finding of a discriminatory purpose on the part of NJDEP” and then concluded that “this impact 
alone is not determinative…” (South Camden 2006, 75-6). The court suggested in a footnote that 
South Camden citizens “should direct their efforts prospectively to the appropriate legislative 
and agency forums and work towards a sensible and meaningful environmental equity policy for 
the future” (116). 
Just as environmental justice plaintiffs have encountered difficulty in successfully 
prosecuting environmental justice claims under Section 601 of Title VI, they have also had 
difficulty using Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act to achieve justice. Section 602 of Title VI 
(Section 2000d-1) provides that  
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each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract 
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to 
effectuate the provisions of section 2000d [Section 601] of this title with respect 
to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general 
applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the 
statute authorizing financial assistance in connection with which the action is 
taken. 
 
Section 602 provides the groundwork for the EPA to make regulations that prohibit EPA funding 
recipients from engaging in actions that have a discriminatory effect. As discussed above, the 
EPA has enacted regulations that attempt to prohibit recipients of EPA funding from 
administering programs that have a discriminatory effect. More specifically, the EPA regulations 
provide that 
A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program which 
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, 
color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or substantially 
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to 
individuals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex. (Nondiscrimination 
in Programs Receiving Federal Assistance from the Environmental Protection 
Agency 2012). 
 
The EPA’s focus on “effect” rather than “intent” is promising. For instance, when the South 
Camden Citizens first took their case forward to the U.S. District Court for New Jersey in 2001, 
it looked as though it would be a victory for the environmental justice movement. Plaintiffs 
asserted that Section 602 provides a private cause of action under Title VI (South Camden D.N.J. 
2001). Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that Section 602’s authorization of the EPA to issue the 
rule prohibiting discriminatory effects provided plaintiffs with the power to sue “on a theory of 
disparate impact discrimination in the administration of a federally funded program” (474). The 
court proceeded to consider the “novel question of whether a recipient of EPA funding has an 
obligation under Title VI to consider racially discriminatory disparate impacts when determining 
whether to issue a permit, in addition to compliance with applicable environmental standards” 
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(474). In its analysis, the court initially recognized that “Section 602 of Title VI clearly 
authorizes federal agencies, such as the EPA, to promulgate regulations implementing Section 
601” (475). Further, the court noted that the EPA has interpreted Title VI to prohibit EPA 
funding recipients from “utilizing ‘criteria and methods’ which have the ‘purpose or effect’ of 
discrimination against individuals based on their race, color, or national origin” (475, quoting 40 
C.F.R. § 7.35(b)). The court also found that these EPA regulations applied to permitting 
decisions (South Camden D.N.J. 2001). Ultimately, the South Camden court granted the 
plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment that the state agency “violated Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act by failing to consider the potential adverse, disparate impact of the [] facility’s 
operation on individuals based on their race, color, or national origin, as part of its decision to 
permit [the] proposed facility” (481). The South Camden court further granted the plaintiffs’ 
request for a preliminary injunction, vacating the permits New Jersey granted to the facility and 
asking the NJDEP to develop a protocol to ensure Title VI compliance (South Camden D.N.J. 
2001). This decision in South Camden to recognize the private right of action for environmental 
justice plaintiffs under Section 602, to recognize that environmental justice plaintiffs may prevail 
by showing a discriminatory impact, and to issue the declaratory relief and preliminary 
injunction, demonstrates what must occur if there is any hope of achieving social equity. 
As previously noted, the victory for the environmental justice movement that was 
achieved in South Camden was temporary (Garland 2007, 22–23). Five days after the decision in 
New Jersey, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Alexander v. Sandoval (2001) that 
there is no private right of action for individuals to sue the government under Section 602. The 
court said, however, that individuals may sue under Section 601 that prohibits intentional 
discrimination (Alexander v. Sandoval 2001, 282–286). Nevertheless, the court noted that a 
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private right to enforce regulations didn’t exist under Section 601. As a result, South Camden 
was not a victory for the environmental justice movement in the case of Section 601 or 602. 
It must be acknowledged that some U.S. circuit courts of appeal, including the Tenth 
Circuit, do not read Alexander v. Sandoval to preclude all claims brought to enforce disparate-
impact claims (e.g., Robinson v. Kansas 2002). Rather, the Court's Alexander decision has been 
read to bar only disparate-impact claims brought by private parties directly under Title VI. The 
Tenth Circuit has stated that disparate-impact claims may still be brought against state officials 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce Section 602 regulations (Robinson v. Kansas 2002). To 
sustain a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that the act complained of was committed 
by a person acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, 
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the U.S. (see Wilder v. Virginia 
Hospital Assoc. 1990). Specifically, a plaintiff must prove that (1) that they are the intended 
beneficiary of the provision sought to be enforced; (2) that the right asserted is not so “vague and 
amorphous” that its enforcement strains judicial competence; and (3) that the provision 
unambiguously imposes a binding obligation on the State (see Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools 
2001). Nevertheless, the circuits are split concerning whether Alexander v. Sandoval effectively 
precludes a Title VI plaintiff from bringing suit under Section 1983. Indeed, the Third, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits have interpreted that case to mean that plaintiffs cannot enforce regulations 
promulgated pursuant to Section 602 through a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(see Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit 2003; South Camden 2001; Wilson v. Collins 2008). 
In sum, Section 601 of Title VI requires proof of intentional discrimination and, although 
Section 602 does not necessarily require proof of intentional discrimination, the U.S. Supreme 
Court curtailed any private cause of action under Section 602 in Alexander v. Sandoval. As a 
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result Title VI is largely ineffective for environmental justice plaintiffs to seek justice in the 
courts. Still, in some circuits, the door is open for plaintiffs to pursue Title VI claims under 
Section 1983. To the extent that plaintiffs are able to prove discriminatory intent, Title VI could 
provide a useful framework for pursuing environmental justice claims, regardless of whether the 
court recognizes a plaintiff’s right to pursue a private right of action under Section 602. As a 
result, one specific recommendation that environmental justice activists have been calling for is 
to amend Title VI so that it clearly allows for a private right of action in the case of any 
discriminatory outcome (Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 2010). Such an 
approach would make the courts more effective at promoting environmental justice. 
 
EPA Handling of Title VI Complaints 
Outside of the courts there is also controversy regarding the EPA’s failure to use Title VI 
to fight environmental injustice. A more extensive agency effort would occur in the agency itself 
through the EPA Office of Civil Rights (OCR). The EPA OCR accepts Title VI complaints but 
emphasizes that it does not represent “recipients” or “complainants” in the process (EPA"
http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/t6guidefaq2.pdf). Thus, while EPA Title VI complaints 
would not be decided in court, it is possible that they could eventually be adjudicated in courts 
upon appeal outside of the agency. Moreover, some Title VI complaints may be linked to civil 
and/or criminal violations so could be adjudicated in federal court in the traditional enforcement 
process (Hiar 2011).  
Unfortunately, Title VI complaints that have been filed with the OCR do not appear to be 
taken seriously by the EPA (Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 2010). None of 
the hundreds of Title VI complaints, for instance, have been recognized as necessitating that 
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federal funding is withdrawn (Deloitte Consulting 2011; Hiar 2011). As the Lawyer’s Committee 
for Civil Rights Under the Law (2010) point out, the total number of Title VI cases that are 
dismissed or rejected by the EPA are simply extraordinary (Deloitte Consulting 2011).  
A report produced for the EPA by Deloitte Consulting (2011, 15-16) suggests that this 
lack of attention to Title VI cases is a reflection of the fact that the EPA OCA “lost sight of its 
mission and priorities.” As one example of this assertion Deloitte indicates that Title VI 
complaints are backlogged as long as four years. Specifically, the failure of the EPA OCA to act 
on Title VI cases has put the agency at odds with the environmental justice ideals set out in EO 
12898.  As a solution, the agency should seek to provide more resources to Title VI complaints 
to avoid delayed justice (Deloitte 2010).The EPA OCR may also consider working more closely 
with private parties to provide guidance and resources that ensure that cases are successfully 
brought forward to help eliminate environmental injustice as opposed to adopting a “hands off” 
approach to the investigative process. Such an approach within the EPA allows for the vague and 
inconsistent handling of complaints and does little to reduce environmental injustice. 
 
Equal Protection Clause  
Environmental justice plaintiffs have also focused on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause provides, "No 
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In 
order to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, plaintiffs must demonstrate defendants’ 
actions resulted in a discriminatory impact and that the defendants intentionally or purposefully 
discriminated against them “based upon plaintiffs’ membership in a protected class” (Committee 
Concerning Community Improvement v. City of Modesto 2009, 702–703). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “an invidious discriminatory purpose may 
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the 
[policy] bears more heavily on one race than another” (Washington v. Davis 1976, 242). The 
court further recognized that the “impact of an official action is often probative of why the action 
was taken in the first place since people usually intend the natural consequences of their actions” 
(Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. 1997, 487). But a facially neutral law is not necessarily 
invalid just because it “may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. 
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial 
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution” (Washington v. Davis 1976, 242). 
To show that facially neutral conduct is intentionally discriminatory in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the government “selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group”(Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 
1979, 279). For example, the plaintiff may show that the policy was “applied in a discriminatory 
manner” or that it was adopted out of discriminatory animus (South Camden D.N.J. 2006, citing 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins 1886, 373–374; Hunter v. Underwood 1985). “Determining whether 
invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor [in the adoption of a facially neutral 
policy] demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may 
be available” (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 1977, 
266). In addition, the court may consider the historical background of the decision; the sequence 
of events leading up to the decision; any departures from the normal procedural or substantive 
sequence; the legislative or administrative history, including statements by decision-making 
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officials; and the foreseeability of any disparate impact of the action (266; see also Columbus Bd. 
Of Education v. Penick, 1979, 464). 
It is important to note that when a challenged governmental policy is "facially neutral," 
plaintiffs may also demonstrate discriminatory intent, in both Title VI and Equal Protection 
cases, by showing “gross statistical disparities” that show that “some invidious or discriminatory 
purpose underlies the policy” (Committee Concerning Community Improvement v. City of 
Modesto 2009, 703). Indeed, the courts have recognized that a showing of “gross statistical 
disparities” alone may provide sufficient proof of intent to discriminate (703). But such cases are 
rare; generally, plaintiffs must show more than just a discriminatory impact and should, as 
discussed above, offer other evidence of discriminatory purpose or intent such as historical 
information and legislative or administrative history (Committee Concerning Community 
Improvement v. City of Modesto 2009).  
In an Equal Protection challenge, once plaintiffs meet the burden of establishing a 
discriminatory purpose based on race, the burden then shifts to the government to demonstrate 
that even in the absence of discriminatory animus, the same decision would have resulted (see 
South Camden D.N.J. 2006). 
The Equal Protection Clause may, at first glance, appear to be a viable way for 
environmental justice plaintiffs to successfully challenge a discriminatory governmental action, 
especially given the potential under this clause to prove discriminatory intent through a showing 
of discriminatory impact. In practice, however, plaintiffs have had little success challenging 
governmental actions based on an Equal Protection argument because plaintiffs have difficulty 
establishing intent. For example, in Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. (1979), 
plaintiffs challenged the issuance of a landfill permit on the grounds that the governmental 
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agency was behaving in a discriminatory fashion when granting permits (Garland 2007). The 
court found that although the three sets of data that were offered, “at first blush, look[ed] 
compelling”, “…these statistics break down under closer scrutiny” and ultimately, the plaintiffs 
were unable to prove discriminatory intent. (Bean 1979, 678). ,  East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood 
Association v. Macon Bibb Planning & Zoning Commission (1989) is another example of the 
courts’ refusing to find intentional discrimination when plaintiffs have asserted an Equal 
Protection claim after the siting of a landfill facility.  (Garland 2007). The court found that while 
the landfill was located in a minority community, the decision was not motivated by a 
discriminatory intent. Because one landfill also existed in a census tract having a majority white 
population, the court could not find a “clear pattern unexplainable on grounds other than race” 
under the Village of Arlington Heights standard (E. Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v. 
Macon Planning & Zoning Commission 1989). As Garland (2007, 17) recognizes, the Bean and 
Twigg cases “illustrate that proving discriminatory intent is a highly challenging standard of 
proof to meet.” As a result of these strict and unrealistic standards of direct evidence of 
discrimination there is not much hope that environmental injustice related to the distribution of 
hazards will be attenuated through court intervention and application of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  
 
National Environmental Policy Act  
Environmental justice plaintiffs have also attempted to assert claims under NEPA on the 
grounds that some federal agency acted in a biased, arbitrary, or capricious way. NEPA requires 
that federal agencies “take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences” of a major federal 
action before taking such action (Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense 
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Council, Inc. 1983). NEPA does not require a particular result and does not require that no 
environmental harm occur; rather, it imposes a mandatory review process (Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife 1992, 605). Agencies must prepare a “detailed statement” so that a reviewing court may 
determine whether the agency has made a good faith effort to consider the NEPA values 
(National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.§ 4332(1)(C)). Federal agencies must 
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for “major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment” (National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 
U.S.C.§ 4332(1)(C)), but may first prepare an environmental assessment (EA) to determine 
whether an EIS is required (Natural Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 40 C.F.R. § 
1508.9(a)(1)). The EA is a concise document that provides enough evidence and analysis for 
determination of whether to prepare an EIS or a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) 
(Natural Environmental Policy Act of 1969 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1)). For example, 
environmental justice researchers and plaintiffs have alleged that an agency failed to properly 
consider environmental justice concerns in an EA prepared in connection with its NEPA review 
of a particular project (see Outka 2006; One Thousand Friends of Iowa v. Mineta 2002; Saint 
Paul Branch of the NAACP v. U.S. Dept. of Transportation 2011). 
One of the bigger challenges for environmental justice plaintiffs in NEPA cases is 
establishing standing (Saint Paul Branch of the NAACP v. U.S. Dept. of Transportation 2011). 
That is, do environmental justice organizations lack standing when harms cannot be directly 
described and an agency determines that the project will have no significant impact on the 
environment? In order to establish standing, plaintiffs must show (1) that at least one of its 
members has suffered a concrete injury that is actual or imminent, not hypothetical; (2) that the 
injury is traceable to the defendant’s action; and (3) that it is likely that the injury will be 
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redressed by a favorable court decision (see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services 2000). However, as a bar to standing, it has been held that “any obligation of [the 
federal agency] to consider environmental justice is not judicially enforceable” (One Thousand 
Friends of Iowa v. Mineta 2002, 1071). Further, it has been acknowledged by some federal 
district courts that environmental justice is not a right that can be used to appeal a lower court 
decision (1084; see also ACORN V. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2000) Finally, it has been 
stated that “the failure to consider ‘environmental justice’ in and of itself cannot support a 
finding [that the federal agency] acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner” (One Thousand 
Friends of Iowa v. Mineta 2002, 25608 at *21; see also Sur Contra La Contaminacion v. E.P.A. 
2000). 
Other courts, however, have acknowledged that even though EO 12898 does not create a 
private right to judicial review, an action may still be subject to environmental justice review 
under NEPA and the Administrative Procedures Act. For example, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals addressed whether the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) adequately 
considered environmental justice concerns in its review of an airport expansion plan 
(Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Administration 2004). In that 
case the city of Boston initiated the environmental justice claim, arguing that the FAA’s use of 
the entire county as the “potentially affected area”, rather than the circumscribed greater Boston 
metropolitan area, was unreasonable. While the court disagreed, and thus the environmental 
justice claim failed, it bears noting that some courts will entertain environmental justice NEPA 
claims. Similarly, in Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board (2003), 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals entertained an environmental justice NEPA claim and 
expressly recognized that “the purpose of an environmental justice analysis is to determine 
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whether a project will have a disproportionately adverse effect on minority and low income 
populations” (Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board 2003). That 
court further noted that “[t]o accomplish this, an agency must compare the demographics of an 
affected population with demographics of a more general character (for instance, those of an 
entire state)” (541).  
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized that although EO 12898 does not 
create a private right of action, an agency’s consideration of environmental justice issues is 
subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
(Coliseum Square Association, Inc. v. Jackson 2006, 232). 
In short, NEPA may, theoretically, be a viable basis on which to successfully assert an 
environmental justice claim. That is, if plaintiffs can establish that the federal agency was 
arbitrary or capricious in considering and disclosing the environmental justice impacts of a 
proposed action a plaintiff may be able to prevail in court. While this has not been tested in any 
court there may be hope for court victories in this approach because it is increasingly clear that 
environmental justice is not examined in any systematic way across or within federal agencies. 
For example, Vajjhala, Van Epps, and Szambelan (2008) studied whether environmental justice 
issues increased in EISs and regulatory impact statements after EO 12898. While the researchers 
found that environmental justice issues were more likely to show up in EIS reports as a result of 
EO 12898, they also found high levels of inconsistency in the way environmental justice was 
addressed in those statements. They also discovered that few reports were arbitrary in the way 
they address environmental justice and did not “contain enough data to assess whether EJ 
impacts are significant” (Vajjhala, Van Epps and Szambelan, 2008, 2). In one agency 
(Department of Transportation) the use of “environmental justice” actually decreases over time 
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(Vajjhala, Van Epps, and Szambelan, 2008). It should not be surprising, then, that environmental 
justice activists have recommended that NEPA be modified to require consistency and “identify 
environmental justice as an issue in NEPA compliance documents” (Lawyers’ Committee For 
Civil Rights 2010, 17). Federal Agencies would then use EIS reports to ensure that 
environmental justice issues are monitored and that injustice is mitigated. Even if a plaintiff were 
to successfully assert an environmental justice claim under NEPA, such a win would not 
necessarily stop environmental injustice, but the agency would likely reconsider the impacts of 
such action on the plaintiff before making its decision.  
 
Conclusions and Moving Forward 
In this chapter we reviewed environmental justice policy and litigation in the federal 
courts. We argue that courts are in a unique position to contribute to or reduce environmental 
injustice through their sentencing duties and common law interpretation functions. In short, 
courts may help shape the environmental justice landscape. In the case of administrative, civil, 
and criminal adjudication for environmental violations we find that courts have done little to 
ameliorate the problem of environmental injustice. However, it also appears that courts have 
done little to contribute to the problem. Overall, the studies by environmental justice academics 
appear to suggest that the monetary fines and penalties handed down from the courts are not 
discriminatory. Instead, these penalties may be the result of complex factors that include the type 
of violation that is pursued by state regulatory agencies. If discrimination in sentencing exists, 
we suggest that it is indirect and may be more appropriately situated in the hands of the 
prosecutor or state regulatory attorney who brings those charges to the courts. There is 
considerable precedence for this assertion in the criminology literature, where it has been well 
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established that prosecutors have significantly more power than judges in determining the 
outcome of any particular case (Bibas 2003). We therefore propose that more attention be 
focused on prosecutorial discretion when examining environmental enforcement. 
In the case of facility siting we also find that federal courts have done little to combat 
environmental injustice. We recognize that Title VI has not been used as President Clinton 
proposed in Executive Order 12898. Moreover, the EPA appears to continually reemphasize the 
importance of EO 12898 and the use of Title VI, but it does little to ensure environmental justice 
in the courts. Recently, the EPA (2011b) suggested that the agency is “pursuing long overdue, 
vigorous, robust, and effective implementation of Title VI.” As of yet this enforcement of Title 
VI in the courts has yet to take place in any serious fashion. Importantly, few Title VI cases have 
been brought forward. Thus, there is really very little that courts do that promote equality under 
Title VI. As we have noted, the courts appear to rule in ways that facilitate and support indirect 
forms of discrimination because they refuse to acknowledge the disparate impact in permitting 
and siting decisions. As a result, we suggest that courts focus more on statistical evidence of 
indirect discrimination in overburdened communities, which should prove especially beneficial 
for those communities that already face disproportionate hazards. This might mean that the EPA 
identifies communities where environmental hazards exist and ensures that no additional hazards 
are sited in those communities. It may also mean that enforcement agencies should spend more 
time inspecting facilities that operate in communities that face significant hazards. 
While the DOJ has supported a right of private enforcement of Title VI regulations, we 
find little evidence that the agency has continued to develop proactive policies that address 
environmental justice through the use of the courts in any significant way (Bratspies et al. 2008). 
Instead, the DOJ has focused on drug enforcement and gang activities in minority communities 
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through anti-drug programs such as “Weed and Seed.” This means that environmental hazards, 
including lead, will continue to threaten low-income communities. DOJ, in combination with the 
EPA, should redirect its efforts toward ensuring equality in environmental enforcement—
especially prosecution. This approach might begin with a focus on lead poisoning and children 
and locate those areas where empirical evidence suggests that lead poisoning still presents a 
serious threat to low-income and minority children and may lead to future problems such as 
learning disabilities, deviance, and even crime (Grandjean 2013). However, to achieve more 
environmental justice through the courts any approach will need to go beyond simply talking 
about environmental justice in agency documents. Instead, the DOJ might identify those 
communities that have the greatest need for enforcement efforts in the form of investigation and 
prosecution. We believe that such a proactive and active approach will bring more attention to 
environmental injustice in the courts and help facilitate corrective justice (see also Konisky, 
2009b). While additional efforts for achieving environmental justice are being pursued in Plan EJ 
2014, these efforts appear to have yet to produce changes in the courts, which are notably absent 
in that planning document (US EPA 2011a). 
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